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PREFACE
Latin American Debt in the 1990s:




When the elephants dance, warns the old adage, the dandelions
should watch out. Private sector borrowers in countries that experi-
ence a foreign exchange liquidity shortage will strongly sympathize
with the dandelions. A private sector entity, particularly one that has
its own reliable source of foreign currency earnings, may be perfectly
creditworthy when viewed in isolation. The company's predicament
results entirely from its location in a country whose aggregate foreign
exchange inflows are insufficient to pay for the country's necessary
imports and external (that is, foreign currency-denominated) debt ser-
vice. It is the common practice of governments when facing such diffi-
culties to enact foreign exchange control regimes that require all (or
most) of the foreign currency earned by public and private sector en-
terprises in the country to be sold up to the central bank in return for
local currency. This centralized pool of foreign exchange is then doled
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out by the government for such purposes, and in such priorities, as the
government sees fit.
As a consequence, even the most solvent private sector company
may find itself irresistibly drawn into its government's external debt
difficulties. But the fate of a private sector borrower that earns for-
eign exchange in these circumstances is much more preferable to one
that sells its goods or services domestically for local currency. The
former at least enjoys, by virtue of its foreign currency income, a natu-
ral hedge against currency devaluation. The latter can only watch
with concern as the government's debt problems result in a currency
devaluation, a slowdown in the local economy and a tightening of
credit in the domestic capital markets. Even when it is permitted to
purchase foreign exchange for the purpose of servicing its external
obligations, a borrower in this position may find the cost of that for-
eign exchange (in devalued local currency) prohibitively high.
The rating agencies have long recognized that even the most
creditworthy private sector borrower cannot resist its government's
call for a centralization of foreign exchange nor can it avoid being
swept up in its government's debt problems. "Sovereign ceiling" is
the rating agencies' shorthand expression for the proposition that no
private sector borrower in a developing country can achieve an exter-
nal debt rating higher than that of its own sovereign unless the trans-
action is structured so as to intercept an off-shore stream of foreign
currency revenue for the benefit of the debtholders, or other special
circumstances exist.'
Unlike the predominantly syndicated bank lending of the late
1970s (which was directed mostly to sovereigns and state owned or
guaranteed enterprises), private sector borrowers have been the prin-
cipal beneficiaries of private capital flows in this decade.2 Inevitably,
therefore, the external debt position of private sector borrowers will
be a centerpiece of concern should liquidity problems recur in one or
more of these countries. The possibility of private sector defaults can-
not be ignored. Both private sector borrowers and their creditors may
therefore be forced to confront issues such as how and where debt
renegotiations will take place, the pros and cons of a bankruptcy alter-
native to renegotiation, and the availability to the creditors - both at
1 Taylor, "Securitizations Can Overcome 'Sovereign Ceiling'," in Duff & Phelps Credit Rat-
ing Co., Perspectives on Emerging Markets, Jan. 1995, at 5; Apasco Outdoes The Sovereign,
EuRoMoNEY, Sept. 1995, at 20.
2 World Bank, World Debt Tables 1994-95, Vol. 1 at 10.
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the theoretical and at the practical levels - of legal remedies such as
attachment of assets, set-off and litigation.
Oddly enough, private sector borrowers during the global debt
crisis of the 1980s did not have much occasion to worry about these
issues. In many of the countries undergoing a generalized external
debt restructuring during the 1980s, formal programs were established
pursuant to which the host government agreed to assume the out-
standing indebtedness of private sector borrowers in return for pay-
ment of the local currency equivalent of the amount due to the central
bank or other monetary authority. These programs often conveyed a
measure of foreign exchange risk protection to the original private
sector borrowers? Over time, these programs operated to transform
most private sector debt into sovereign debt of the host country.
If liquidity problems again afflict one or more developing coun-
tries, the fate of private sector borrowers is not clear. Not only is the
stock of private sector debt far larger today (both in nominal terms
and as a percentage of overall credit exposure in most countries) than
it was in 1982, the special circumstances that induced the governments
of the debtor countries to assume or guarantee private sector debt in
the 1980s may not be replicated in the future. In addition, the lenders
of the 1990s (principally bondholders) will almost certainly respond
differently to the financial problems of their LDC borrowers than did
the lenders of the 1970s (principally commercial banks). They may,
for example, show far less reluctance to pursue their legal remedies.
The precarious position of private sector borrowers in the current en-
vironment was highlighted by the Mexican devaluation crisis of De-
cember 1994. Although the risk of widespread default by Mexican
private sector borrowers was averted, this risk seemed disturbingly
imminent to many observers.4
The pressing nature of these concerns led Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law to organize5 and host a colloquium in the spring of
3 The Mexican program involved the establishment of a trust, Fideicomiso para la Cobertura
de Riescos Cambiarics (FICORCA). See El Koury, Mexico's Foreign Exchange Programme for
Private Sector Companies, INT'L Frm. L. REv., July 1983 at 18. The principal author of the
FICORCA program was a promising young economist by the name of Ernesto Zedillo; a man
who was later to advance in life. The Philippine program was called Circular 1076. See Lee
Buchheit, Details of the Philippine Debt Repayment Programme, IVrr'L Fin. L. REv., Dec. 1985,
at 15.
4 Craig Torres and Paul B. Carroll, Fear of Mexican Defaults Stalks Peso, WALL ST. J., Feb.
17, 1995, at A6, col. 1.
5 Planning of the conference was the joint responsibility of Prof. Ralph Reisner, Dean
David Van Zandt and William Elwin, Associate Dean. They were assisted by an Advisory Com-
mittee which included Lee Buchheit, Esq. of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; Ambassador
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1995 which brought together noted legal and financial experts from
throughout the hemisphere.6 The agenda for that conference is out-
lined in Appendix A. The articles appearing in this symposium are an
outgrowth of the conference. For the most part, these articles focus
on the unique issues arising from foreign currency debt exposure of
the private sector.
An introductory article, "Cross-Border Lending: What's Different
This Time," by Lee Buchheit, analyzes the principal differences in
cross-border lending practices in this decade in comparison with those
of former periods. The article by Messrs. Darrow, Darrow, Doetsch,
Jauregui-Rojas and Nader S., "Restructuring Strategies For Mexican
Eurobond Debt," focuses on the issues likely to arise in the context of
the restructuring of Mexican private sector Eurobond debt. Rory
MacMillan's contribution, "Proposals for Sovereign Debt Workout
Systems," explores alternate models for the renegotiation of sovereign
debt. The article entitled "A Brief Incursion Into Brazilian Bank-
ruptcy Law," by Antonio Mendes, examines the potential impact of
Brazilian bankruptcy laws on the rights of foreign creditors. The do-
mestic impact of the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and the Mexican Gov-
ernment's response to the ensuing economic dislocations, with
particular reference to the banking sector, are reviewed in the article
entitled "Mexico's Banks After the December 1944 Devaluation - A
Chronology of the Government's Response" by Messrs. Karaoglan and
Lubrano. The symposium closes with "Remedies and Judicial En-
forcements." In this article, six conference panelists analyze a hypo-
thetical private sector debt problem in terms of the legal remedies
available to the creditors.
Emilio J. Cardenas; Troland S. Link, Esq. of Davis, Polk & Wardell; Danforth Newcomb, Esq. of
Shearman & Sterling; and Roger Thomas, Esq. of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
6 Speakers at the conference included: David Barnard of Linklaters & Paines, London; Lee
Buchheit of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, New York; Emilio J. Cardenas, Ambassador of
Argentina to the United Nations; Peter V. Darrow of Mayer, Brown & Platt, New York; Doug
A. Doetsch of Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago; Jonathan L. Greenblatt of Shearman & Sterling,
Washington DC; Thomas Heather of Rich, Heather & Mueller, Mexico City; Kevin Keogh of
White & Case, New York; Troland S. Link of Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York; Paul M.
McGonagle of First National Bank of Chicago, Chicago; Antonio Mendes of Pinheiro Neto-
Advogados, Sao Paolo, Brazil; Danforth Newcomb of Shearman & Sterling, New York; James E.
Roselle of First Chicago Corp.; Mark M. Rossell of Shearman & Sterling, New York; Pablo G.
Schefel of Standard & Poor's, New York; Kenneth Telljohann of Lehman Bros., New York; and
David E. Van Zandt, Dean of Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago.
